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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Development is one of the most important concerns in economic policy 
debates. The benefits of development  is reflected in the general well 
being of the members of a country. An indication of the importance of 
economic development is  the large number of studies that investigates 
the determinants of economic development. This thesis is a combination 
of two essays in development economics that explores the implication of 
income inequality and capital liberalization on economic development. 
 
The first essay — Income Inequality, Rent-seeking and  Economic 
Growth in  Resource Abundant Countries, revisits the debate on the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. Prevailing 
research on the inequality-growth nexus  suggests that inequality has a 
negative impact on economic growth of a country. In addition to the 
relationship between inequality and economic growth, this essay reviews 
studies that aim to ascertain the reasons behind the observation  that 
countries who have abundant natural resources do not outperform 
resource-scarce countries – the so called resource curse hypothesis. 
Following the literatures, we hypothesize that inequality is more 
detrimental to economic performance in resource-abundant countries. 
Using the system generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel 
estimation method and data set for the period 1988-2012, we compare the 
relationship between inequality and economic growth in resource and 
non-resource abundant countries. Our results confirm that the negative 
impact of income inequality on economic growth is amplified for 
countries that are endowed with abundant natural resources. 
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In the second essay — Greasing The Revolving Door: Foreign Aid, 
Governance and Private Capital Flows, we revisit the debate on the 
importance of capital liberalization on economic performance. Using 
Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimation technique that is  proposed 
in Zellner and Theil (1962), we synthesize studies on the determinants of 
governance and capital flows. We find evidence of a revolving door 
relationship. Foreign aid has a negative impact on governance and, 
thereby, reduces  capital inflows since poor governance hinders capital 
inflows. The need to fill the gap that is created by private capital outflows 
encourages inflow of foreign aid, which in turn harms governance. Our 
empirical result has a clear policy implication. Capital liberalization could 
grease a revolving door and handicap economic development in  the aid  
receiving countries. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Income Inequality, Rent-seeking and  Economic Growth in  Resource 
Abundant Countries 
Keywords: Inequality; Rent-seeking; Economic growth 
 
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In an interview, after a governorship re-run in Osun, a state in  Nigeria, a 
former  Minister of Aviation showed his dissatisfaction for the outcome 
of the election. He asserted that the All Progressives Congress (APC) 
party openly bribed voters with 100,000 Naira each (Odunsi,  2018). In 
Venezuela, it is claimed that the election process that  led to the re-
election of President Nicolás Maduro was characterized by widespread 
vote buying; an alleged vote-buying in return for food and other gifts has 
been reported  by some commentators (Rathbone and Yuk, 2018). In 
Pakistan, a politician who agonized  that he did not win an election 
because of  his opponent had bought votes from  the poor families  spoke 
to Sarwar Bari, an author at The Express Tribune, on how  he was 
negotiating vote rates in seven poor localities in his constituency (Bari, 
2018). The observations in Nigeria, Venezuela and Pakistan  are but a few 
examples of vote buying. 
 
With the observations above, other implications of inequality and  
poverty come to mind. Aside from the possibilities that inequality creates 
for vote buying, it is believed that income inequality could pose a threat  
to countries‘ economic growth plans, especially in the presence of 
financial underdevelopment. Yet there is scepticism surrounding 
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economic equality. Some of  the most famous, comprehensive and 
compelling  criticisms are demonstrated in Okun (1975) — EQUALITY 
AND EFFICIENCY: The Big Tradeoff. Okun sees the income 
distribution that emanates from  market as rewards (to the energetic) and 
penalties (to the lazy)  that are  intended to encourage effort and channel 
it into socially productive society , or  rather as divine revelation of the 
justice of a competitive economy, cautioning that any insistence to carve 
the pie into equal sizes could  shrink the size of the pie. To summarize 
Okun‘s essay: There is  a tradeoff  between equality and efficiency; the 
inefficiencies of redistribution include the adverse effects on economic 
incentives of the rich and the poor,  and the administrative cost of  tax 
collection and transfer programs. 
 
In principle, the resource-rich countries should have better 
economic performance than the (otherwise identical) resource-poor 
countries. Natural resource, for example, could be used to finance 
investment, such as physical capital or human capital. Paradoxically, a lot 
of evidence exist to show that many resource-rich countries have not 
performed better than resource-poor countries. In some cases, these 
countries have even recorded lower economic performances  than  their 
resource-poor counterpart. Many solutions have been  proposed  to boost 
economic performance in the resource abundant countries. For example, 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik(2006) argued that  improvement in 
institution could reduce the negative impact of resource abundance. For 
Manzano and  Rigobon (2001), the negative relationship between 
resource abundance and economic performance could be due to debt 
overhang in the resource abundant countries. 
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A combination of  the literature on inequality-growth nexus and the 
literature on resource curse suggest that inequality could have a more 
negative impact on economic growth in countries that have natural 
resources in abundance. We provide empirical analyses that suggest that 
this is the case. Methodologically, this paper  uses the system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator and  a sample of 64 
countries for the period 1988  to 2012. From the point of policy 
implication, our analyses complement  the suggestions that would enable 
for optimal growth in resource abundant countries. We  propose that 
reducing income inequality could help reduce the potentially negative 
impact of resource abundance on economic growth.  
 
The next section discusses the related literatures. Section 2.3 
presents the empirical framework. Section 2. 4 discusses the data used  
for the study. In Section 2.5 we present and discuss  the empirical results. 
Section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Our study builds on two strands of literatures, namely the resource curse 
literature and the inequality-growth nexus literature. In this section we 
will discuss the theoretical and empirical studies in these literatures and 
highlight a potential outcome from the combination of  these studies. 
 
THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
 
Numerous studies demonstrate the relationship that inequality and 
redistribution have with economic growth. First, from the point of view 
that profit is an incentive for firms  to be in business, and that large 
demand for firms' products is required in order for firms who use 
increasing  returns to scale technology to be successful, Murphy et al. 
(1989) hypothesized that equality is beneficial for industrialization. 
Specifically, following   Murphy et al. (1989), when the utility function is 
non-homothetic, a large middle class is necessarily required for 
industrialization since concentration of income among the very wealthy 
means that demand will likely be insufficient to give manufacturers the 
required profit-incentive to embark on manufacturing.  
 
Galor and Zeira (1993) developed a small open economy model that 
is characterized by a lending rate that is below  the  borrowing rate due to 
imperfect credit market where dynasties can be monitored at a cost. In  
their economy, a high enforcement cost makes it certain for initial income 
distribution to persist, and dynasties who start with a high income above a 
threshold invest in human capital and converge to a high wealth level 
while dynasties who inherit a wealth below this threshold perform 
contrariwise. In this setup, therefore, when a large fraction of the 
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population  start with a high enough wealth the average wealth in the 
economy is high. Further, as Galor and Zeira (1993) noted,  if the 
productivity for  the unskilled labour, skilled wage and required human 
capital  expenditure grows at a constant rate, with the latter two higher 
than the former, then inequality affects economic growth as well.  
 
Inequality can have negative impact on economic growth if it 
increases the average number of children per family. One of the 
conclusions in Galor and Zang (1997) is that countries that have larger 
families, but are otherwise similar to other countries, have lower 
proportion of skilled labour force and lower per-capita output. This  
seems intuitive, resources are spaced over a large number when a family 
has a large family size. Morand (1999) demonstrated that parents with 
human capital levels below some  threshold give birth to more children 
and invest less in the quality of their children. Since countries that  have 
high proportion of unskilled parents will  likely be the countries that have 
less human capital, and since human capital plays a positive role in 
economic growth, economic growth is possibly lower in the countries that 
have high level of inequality. 
 
Following Alesina and Perotti (1996), income inequality increases 
social discontent which fuels social unrests; social unrest increases the 
probability of coups, revolutions and mass violence which are linked to 
uncertainty and disruption of productive activities, thus, respectively, 
inducing  investors to postpone projects and leading to fall in the 
productivity of  labour and capital. The fall in the productivities of labour 
and capital imply a fall in economic growth. Additionally, since domestic 
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investment is an important determinant of  a country‘s economic growth1, 
by reducing investment income inequality reduces economic growth. In 
addition to the role of inequality in deterring investment, the time spent 
by the poor on  non productive activities represents a direct waste of  
resources because the time and energy used in these activities imply a loss 
in the productive efforts of an economy (Barro, 2000, p.7). 
 
According to Glaeser, Scheinkman and  Shleifer (2003) since 
income inequality means that institutions or courts are likely to favour the 
unjust, income inequality by leading  to subversion of institutions could 
increase private expropriation and reduce investment. As Jung-Jong-Sung 
and Khagram (2005) concluded, societies with greater levels of inequality 
are social structurally conducive to corruption, defined as abuse of office 
or power: In high inequality societies, the large members of poor are more 
likely to be deprived of basic public services such as education and health 
than in low-income inequality economies. Thus, they are more likely to 
rely on petty corruption (Jong-Sung and Khagram, 2005). 
 
Income redistribution is the common opinion among poor members 
of countries that  have  income  inequality. Some studies argue that 
redistribution has positive impact on economic growth while some others 
argue otherwise. First, redistribution can increase economic growth 
through an opportunity-enhancing effect; in the presence of credit market 
imperfections it is difficult for everyone who wishes to invest to borrow, 
despite having a high productivity level. And because of diminishing 
                                                          
1
 Levine and Renelt (1992) identified a robust correlation between economic growth and  
share of investment in GDP 
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returns to productivity, it might be worth considering that capital is 
spaced among many people since it will imply higher a aggregate level of 
productivity and a higher economic growth rate  in the economy (Aghion, 
Caroli and Garcia-Peñalosa,1999). Also, redistribution might lead to  
higher level of incentive to work if majority of the capital used in 
production are owned by the entrepreneur (worker). This is because a 
worker would exert less effort in production when he has to share the 
revenue with a lender than when he has all the revenue to himself 
(Aghion et al., 1999). 
 
In a non-overlapping generation framework where each generation 
lives for two periods and human capital is a combination of inherited 
human capital and public education that is financed with taxation, 
redistribution can increase economic growth since it funds public 
education (see Saint-Paul and Verdier,1993). According to Saint-Paul and 
Verdier (1993), however, it is important that  the tax that will be used to 
finance public education is non-distortionary. Notable studies that 
emphasize the distortion created by redistribution  include Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). In these studies, the 
presence of high inequality leads to redistribution which  reduces  the 
return that can be appropriated  from investment.  
 
While higher taxation and redistribution are generally perceived as 
the outcomes of the presence of median voter who has a small amount of 
wealth when compared to the average income in an economy, in a model 
where the government expenditure generates only consumption services, 
Li and Zou (1998) showed  that income tax rate is higher the more equal 
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the income distribution in an economy becomes when the  intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution  is  less than one. In Li and Zou (1998), higher 
income of the median voter leads to a vote for higher taxation since  
individuals do not  provide government services to themselves, so that 
when the median voter`s income increases  the need to get the best 
possible utility level from consumption of government services and  the 
consumption  of the goods which  he can directly purchase leads to higher 
taxation since taxation  is the only source of government revenue. 
Because taxation reduces capital accumulation  which has a positive 
impact on economic growth, Li and Zou (1998) concluded that 
inequality(redistribution) increases (reduces) economic growth. 
 
Moreover, inequality and  redistribution could have impacts in 
developing countries that are different from the impact they may have in 
advanced countries. Following Galor and Tsiddon (1996), a relatively 
poor economy that values equity as well as prosperity may confront a 
difficult tradeoff between equality in the short run and prosperity in the 
long run. Dynasties whose ancestors are initially skilled, in the sense that 
they had  high human capital, converge to a higher and a stable steady 
state level of human capital, resulting to high income inequality between 
the initially unskilled and the skilled dynasties. Since human capital of the 
unskilled remains intact, there is a high  average level of  human capital in 
the economy. At some point, the resultant increase in average human  
capital increases the technology of the economy so that both the initially-
unskilled and the skilled converge to the same high level of human capital 
that is accompanied by economic growth. If the economy implements 
redistribution of income prematurely, the economy may be trapped at a 
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low equilibrium level of income.
2
 It therefore  follows that the typical 
poor economy could benefit from high inequality. In a similar line of 
reasoning, Barro (2000) noted that when investments require high setup 
cost before it can be useful, redistribution might be harmful when the 
median income is much lower than the setup cost. Barro (2000)  cites two 
cases: First, education, might be useful when carried out beyond primary 
school which implies that it might be reasonable to allow the very rich 
who can go beyond this level to invest in education. Second, businesses 
may be productive at a level beyond some threshold. As for Matsuyama 
(2011, p. 344), a more equal distribution is growth-enhancing among 
developed countries because they are so rich that an average household 
would face no borrowing constraint to finance any profitable project.  
 
One of the famous paradoxes in economics is that the economic 
performance of the economies that have abundant natural resources fall 
behind the economic performance of the  natural-resource-scarce 
economies. This observation is known as the resource curse or the 
paradox of  plenty. Studies that demonstrate the reasons behind this  issue 
are broadly classified into Dutch disease and Rent-seeking. Important 
studies under Dutch disease include Corden and Neary (1982),  
Matsuyama (1991) and Sachs and Warner (1995). Corden and  Neary 
(1982) explored de-industrializing  pressures that could arise because of a 
booming extractive sector. Their three goods – two traded (energy and 
manufactures)  and one non-traded (services)– small open economy 
model, with  each sector using a single specific factor and a factor of 
production that is perfectly mobile between sectors, underscored that a 
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 Also see the remark in Galor and Zang (1997,p.207) 
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boom in energy sector leads to resource movement effect and spending 
effect. The implication  of  the resource movement effect and speeding 
effect is the reallocation of  resources from manufacturing  other sector, 
thus de-industrialization, with the direct de-industrialization amplified by 
appreciation in the  real exchange (defined as the relative price of non-
traded to traded goods). 
 
In Matsuyama (1991), under the assumptions of an endogenous 
productivity in manufacturing due to the level of experience that  is 
acquired through production, an exogenous productivity in agriculture, 
free mobility of labour between agricultural sector and manufacturing 
within a country and a non homothetic preference, a higher agricultural 
productivity releases labour  and, thereby, accelerates economic growth, 
if the economy is a closed economy. When the economy is open, such 
that international trade is permitted, labour is immobile across countries 
and learning by doing effects do not spill over across economies, the 
model predicts that manufacturing productivity and economic growth 
would reduce in a country if the country has an initial comparative 
advantage in agriculture. As Sachs and Warner (1995) pointed out, the 
framework in Matsuyama (1991) may only be useful for studying labour-
intensive production but less relevant for natural resources sectors like oil 
production since oil production uses very little labour. Sachs and Warner 
(1995) built an overlapping generations economy with three sectors, 
namely a tradable natural resource sector, a tradable (non-resource) 
manufacturing sector and a non-traded sector. In addition to the 
assumption of learning by doing in Matsuyama (1991),where learning by 
doing is generated in the manufacturing sector and benefits only 
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manufacturing sector, Sachs and Warner (1995)  assumed that non traded 
sector benefits from the human capital generated from manufacturing. 
According to their model, economies that experience a temporary 
resource boom will have a lower rate of growth for several periods than 
the economies that are otherwise similar. The reason is that a boom which 
increases demand for non traded goods would increase prices of non 
traded goods and shift labour away from the manufacturing sector, and a 
reduction in labour in the manufacturing sector implies that the economy 
will lose the benefits of human capital that is generated only in the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
Notable studies that demonstrate resource curse from a rent-seeking 
perspective include Torvik (2002), Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) 
and Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2014). Torvik (2002) built a model 
where an increase in natural resources creates an incentive for 
entrepreneurs to choose rent seeking over production leading to reduction 
in output and income. In Mehlum et al. (2006), the presence of grabber 
friendly institutions give an advantage to rent-seeking activities. In 
Robinson et al. (2014), an incumbent politician who desires to be re-
elected  so as to  benefit from natural resource engages in clientelism, and 
offers to employ voters in the public sector in exchange for their votes. A 
proposition that emerges from their model states the following: (a) A 
permanent resource boom increases public sector employment and 
decreases privates sector employment; (b) A temporary resource boom 
decreases public sector employment and increases private sector 
employment, and (3) An anticipated future resource boom increases 
public sector employment and decreases private sector employment. In 
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another proposition, Robinson et al. (2014),  suggest, similar to Mehlum 
et al. (2006), that a resource boom increases (decreases) total income if 
institutions are sufficiently strong (weak). 
 
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
 
With ordinary least squares (OLS)  and a  historical sample of nine 
developed countries
3
, Persson and Tabellini (1994) showed that an 
increase of  0.07 (one standard deviation in the sample) in the income 
share of the top 20% lowers the average annual growth by just below half 
a percentage point, at least. Correspondingly, for the period 1960-1985, 
with OLS and a sample of 56 developing and developed countries, 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) found that a one standard deviation ( 3.099 
in the sample) increase in equality increases growth by about half a 
percentage point
4
.  Alesina and Rodrik (1994) presented cross-country 
evidence of the impact of land inequality and income inequality, using 
OLS and 2SLS, that show that an inverse relationship exists between 
economic growth and  wealth inequality  and economic growth and 
income equality. However, while Persson and Tabellini (1994) found that 
                                                          
3
 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States 
4
 The general conclusion obtained are reinforced in their two stage least square (2SLS) 
estimation of structural implications of their theoretical  model; inequality reduces 
investment and as investment has positive impact on economic growth, inequality 
reduces economic growth. Also, inequality affects redistribution and redistribution is 
found to have negative impact on economic growth. 
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inequality has negative impact in only democratic countries, Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) found that the relationship between  inequality and growth 
do not depend on whether a country is democratic or non-democratic.  
 
Using 2SLS and a cross-section of countries, for the period 1960-
1985, Alesina and Perotti (1995) estimated a two-equation  model in 
which the dependent variables are investment and socio-political 
instability. Results from the socio political equation show that an increase 
in  the share of the middle class decreases the index of political 
instability. And the results from the investment equation suggest that 
political instability has an adverse effect on investment. Following these 
results, Alesina and Perotti (1995) concluded that since investment is an 
important engine of economic growth, by reducing investment, income 
inequality has a negative impact on economic growth. Empirical results in 
Perotti (1996), also, show support for the positive association between 
income equality and economic growth. Estimates from their reduced form 
regressions range from  0.047 to 1.78, and  also suggest that the impact of 
equality on economic growth does  not generally depend on the presence 
or absence of democracy. On the channels through which equality has a 
positive impact on economic growth, their study suggests  that income 
equality increases economic growth by reducing  sociopolitical  
instability, by reducing  fertility rates and by increasing  human capital 
investment. Following a replication  and an extension of  the study by 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Knack and Keefer  (1997) concluded that 
income inequality harms economic growth and that there exist no 
differential impact of income inequality on economic growth in 
democracies and in non democracies.  Easterly (2007)  instrumented  
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inequality with the ratio of  the share of arable land suitable for wheat to 
the share of arable land suitable for sugarcane and concluded that 
inequality has negative impact on output, productivity, schooling and 
institutions.  
 
In Sub-Saharan African, Nel (2003) found  that inequality has a 
negative impact on economic growth over the medium term, but that the 
impact is neither robust nor strong. Additionally, Nel (2003), contrary to 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), finds that high levels of inequality do not 
affect political stability, implying that the impact of inequality on 
economic growth could be as a result on other factors but political 
instability. Result from their study suggest that inequality affect the risk 
perception of potential investors and could affect economic growth 
though this channel.  
 
Knowles (2005)  found that inequality  has negative impact on 
economic growth . Moreover, when different measures of inequality are 
used, they found that inequality of expenditure when consistently 
measured  has negative impact on economic growth while consistently 
measured gross income inequality, that  is  using only gross individual 
income distribution, has no significant impact. This result led Knowles to 
suggest that empirical  studies that combines income-expenditure 
classifications has to be interpreted with caution 
 
Bagchi and Svejnar (2015) developed a measure of wealth 
inequality using the Forbes billionaires list. Additionally, they  developed 
measures for politically connected and politically unconnected wealth 
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inequality. Following the results from their analyses, they concluded that 
while politically connected wealth inequality affects economic growth, 
politically unconnected inequality has no significant impact on economic 
growth.  
 
In contrast to the above evidence that suggest  the possibility of a 
negative relationship between inequality and economic growth, empirical 
analyses  in Li and Zou (1998) suggest ,as they hypothesized,  that 
income inequality has a positive impact on economic growth. Similarly, 
using Arellano-Bond (difference GMM) estimator, Forbes (2000) 
challenged the belief that income inequality has negative impact on 
economic growth. They concluded that an increase in the country‘s 
income inequality has a significant positive correlation with subsequent 
economic growth, both in the short and medium term.   
 
Barro (2000)  used three-stage least squares estimator (3SLS) to 
investigate the impact of inequality on economic growth. For the total 
sample,  they found that inequality has no impact on  subsequent  
economic growth. When Barro (2000) omits fertility rate the coefficient 
of inequality becomes significantly negative. This result suggests  that 
inequality has negative impact on economic growth  only through the 
fertility rate channel as in Galor and Zang (1997) and  Morand (1999) 
where inequality leads to more quantity of children while at the same time 
reducing the quality of children. Results from their interaction of  
inequality and  level of economic development suggests that income 
inequality necessarily has negative impact on economic growth for poor 
countries and could have a positive impact on economic growth in 
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developed economies. Barro (2000)  linked this to financial 
underdevelopment. According to  Barro (2000), in the poor counties 
where there is severe credit market problems inequality has negative 
impact , whereas in the rich countries, where financial underdevelopment 
is not severe,  the positive impact of inequality could dominate. Although 
in the theoretical literature the impact of inequality on economic growth 
could occur indirectly by reducing domestic investment or human capital, 
Barro(2000) concluded that the impact of inequality  lack explanatory 
power for investment ratio and male school attainment at the secondary 
and higher levels.  
 
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995) seems to be the first empirical result on the 
resource curse. Since their findings that resource abundant countries have 
less economic growth than  non-resource abundant countries,  many 
studies have investigated this phenomenon. For example, for the three 
measures of education used by Gylfason (2001), namely public 
expenditure on education, expected years of schooling for females and 
gross secondary-school enrolment, Gylfason  (2001)  found a negative 
relationship between share of natural capital  in national wealth and 
education. Based on this, Gylfason (2001) concluded that resource 
abundance crowds out human capital and  thereby slow down the pace of 
economic development. 
 
Following Manzano and Rigobon (2001), poor economic growth  
performance in natural resource abundant countries  could be due to debt 
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overhang
5
 in the resource abundant countries and not resource abundance 
per se. In Manzano and Rigobon (2001), the coefficient that measures 
resource curse became insignificant after  debt was controlled for in a 
cross section economic growth regression. 
 
Using cross-country growth regressions for the period 1980 to 1995, 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) offered evidence that  resource curse may 
be due to the  inability of government to manage large resource revenues 
prudently. Specifically, results from their analyses suggest that it is the 
interaction of government consumption and resource abundance that 
provides an explanation of the curse and  that once this interaction is 
controlled for, the impact of resource abundance on economic growth 
becomes at insignificant or positive. Further, evidence of resource curse 
exist for resource abundant countries  with  negative genuine savings 
(measured by gross savings minus depletion of resources) whereas 
resource abundant countries that avoided zero or negative genuine savings 
do not seem to  have resource curse. Using genuine income where 
depreciation is subtracted from GDP as, Neumayer (2004) reinforces 
resource curse results.  
 
Following the result in  Mehlum et al. (2006) which suggest that 
countries benefit from natural resources when the quality of institutions 
are high, Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2007) use four measures of 
                                                          
5
 In the 1970s, commodity prices were high and the resource abundant countries 
obtained a huge debt. When the commodity prices collapsed in the 1980s the resource 
abundant countries were left with low flow of foreign resources to pay back the huge 
debts (Manzano and Rigobon, 2001). 
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resource abundance, ranked in terms of  their technical appropriability 
and demonstrated that the effect of resources is determined by the type of 
resources a country possesses and the quality of its institutions. 
Specifically, they found that the more technically appropriable a 
country‘s resources is, the more important it is for the country to have 
good institutions. 
 
Van der ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) concluded that the effect of 
resource on economic growth is swamped by indirect negative effect 
through volatility of output  per capita that results from high volatility of 
world prices of natural resource. Cross-section empirical  analyses by 
Sala-i-Martin and  Subramanian (2013) suggest that resource abundance 
has  a negative  impact on economic growth, through reduction on quality 
of institutions, and that once institution is controlled for natural resources 
can have a positive effect on economic growth. 
 
On the contrary, using actual data on fuel and mineral reserves, 
criticizing the primary export  measure used by Sachs and Warner(1995), 
Stijns (2005) concluded that natural resource abundance has not been a 
significant structural determinant of economic growth between 1970 and 
1989. Also, contrary to Gylfason (2001), Stijns (2006) investigated  if 
natural resource-abundant countries accumulate more or  less human 
capital  than resource poor countries and concluded that subsoil wealth 
and resource rents per capita are correlated with improved indicators of 
human capital.  
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From the empirical studies that we have reviewed , we conclude as 
follows. Although the empirical literature on the  relationship between  
income inequality and economic growth is rather  divided, in the sense 
that some studies show that inequality has a negative  impact on 
economic growth, some show that inequality has a positive impact and 
some others  show a rather mixed result,  preponderance of  the evidence 
suggest that  inequality has a negative impact on economic growth. The 
evidence on the relationship between resource abundance and economic 
performance seems  to suggest that, at least,  countries that have resources 
in abundance have not  performed  better than countries that do not have 
abundant resources.  
 
To our knowledge, the inequality-growth literature has not 
considered that inequality could have a more pronounced  impact in 
resource-abundant economies, making redistribution more important in 
these economies. The resource curse literature suggests that one of the  
reasons why resource abundance could impact negatively on economic 
growth is because of rent seeking tendency where entrepreneurs abandon  
production and go into say politics. When there is income inequality, it 
means there are few potential entrepreneurs in the first place. In the 
presence of  resource abundance these entrepreneurs  who could engage 
their entrepreneurial skills or financial capabilities in productive activities  
may find  it more profitable to go into rent seeking. The potential 
entrepreneurs compare the net benefits of going to non-productive 
activities with the net benefits of going into rent seeking. Inequality could 
promote rent seeking because the  potential entrepreneurs face few 
competition as well as a lot of poor people that are less educated and  
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struggle to afford the basic requirements for human survival and ,thus, 
vote by their stomach, selling their votes at an insignificant amount (see 
Stokes, 2005). The implication of having few competitors and poor 
masses is an insignificant amount of campaign costs. Therefore, we 
expect that  manufacturing activities  will less in  resource-abundant 
countries, in the presence of inequality. Since the modern firms are the 
engine of  innovation, productivity and economic growth, we hypothesize 
that inequality is more detrimental to economic growth in natural resource 
rich countries.   
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2.3 .  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
To investigate if natural resource abundance play a role in the inequality-
growth nexus, as conjectured above, we will estimate the following three-
way linear interaction
6
 economic growth equation: 
 
G =   β1 initial GDP per capita   +  β2 FU × IN+  β3FU × IN × RA   
+ γ ,𝐗  + u              (1) 
 
G is economic growth. initial GDP per capita is logarithm of the GDP per 
capita in the some given previous period, and it is included to allow for 
the possibility of convergence in per capita income. IN is inequality. FU 
is financial underdevelopment measure. RA is a dummy variable which 
takes one if a country is resource abundant and zero otherwise. u is an 
error term that captures unobserved effects that could impact on economic 
growth but are not included. X contains the control variables.  
 
Equation (1) investigates the impact  that income inequality will 
have on economic growth  in resource abundant countries when compared  
to the  impact that  inequality will have in the non-resource abundant 
countries in the presence of underdeveloped financial system. Specifically 
we are interested in the sign of coefficient β3 in the following equation: 
 
                                                          
6
 Our specification is borrowed from Nili and Rastad (2007). Nili and Rastad (2007) 
compared  the impact of  financial development on economic growth in oil and non-oil 
economies. 
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∂ G /∂IN    =    β2 FU  +  β3FU × RA    =      β2 +  β3RA  FU     (2)
  
A negative β
3
 suggests that, in the presence of financial 
underdevelopment, income inequality has  more detrimental impact on 
economic growth in resource abundant countries than in non-resource 
abundant countries. 
 
 An important concern  in empirical  studies  is  whether an 
explanatory variable of interest is  endogenous, in  the sense that it is 
correlated with the error term. A target-explanatory variable can  be 
correlated with the error term due to the presence of omitted variables that 
are jointly correlated with the explanatory variable  and the dependent 
variable,  measurement error
7
 and simultaneity (see Wooldridge, 2010, 
pp.54-44). To avoid omitted variable bias, we include variables that have 
received some support either in empirical or theoretical literatures, 
namely inflation, population, trade openness, foreign direct investment, 
domestic investment, government consumption and real effective 
exchange rate 
8
.  
 
                                                          
7
 Variables suggested by theory and variable that can be obtained are often at conflict: it 
is difficult to have measures that accurately fit variables of interest. Our study would use 
measures that have been employed in previous studies. Thus, we would ignore the issue 
of measurement error while taking into consideration that our result could be driven by 
bias due to measurement error. 
8
 Domestic investment, government consumption, real effective exchange rate and 
external debt are used for sensitivity purpose  and the rationale behind their usage will be  
explained  in the result section. 
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Following the Stolper–Samuelson theorem (see Wood 1997), trade 
openness should increase the relative wage of the unskilled labour in 
developing countries and should reduce the  relative wage of the unskilled 
labour in developed countries since the developing and developed 
countries respectively have abundance of unskilled and skilled labour and 
export goods that uses respectively unskilled and skilled labour. However, 
trade openness could widen inequality in a developing country if  labour-
intensive non-traded goods that are  produced by the developing country 
are close substitutes for a more skilled-intensive traded  good, such that 
greater openness reduces the price of the more skill-intensive traded good, 
inducing consumers to buy more of it and less of the non-traded good, 
resulting to a fall in demand for unskilled labour if the fall in the demand 
for unskilled labour in the non-traded good is not offset by a rise in the 
unskilled labour in traded good. Nevertheless, if a country has a 
comparative advantage in an infrastructure-intensive good that is 
complementary to skilled labour, trade openness can  increase the demand 
for (and wages of)  skilled relative to unskilled workers.  
 
In a theoretical analysis of the impact of foreign direct investment 
on inequality by Feenstra and Hanson (1997), capital flow from North to 
South reduces the return to capital in South, causing the number of 
intermediate inputs that are in need of skilled labour and  are produced in 
the South to increase, increasing the relative demand for skilled labour 
and relative wage of skilled labour. In line with their theory, their 
empirical analysis suggests that rising wage inequality in Mexico during 
the 1980s is connected with foreign direct investment, accounting for over 
50% of the increase in the skilled labour wage share in the late 1980s.  
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Using an instrumental variables estimation method, Barro (1995) 
found that an increase by 10 percentage points in the annual inflation rate 
is associated with a decline by 0.2-0.3 percentage points in the annual 
growth rate of real per capita GDP. In line with Easterly and Fischer 
(2001), inflation could widen income inequality because the  poor 
normally have income that are not fully indexed to inflation and are less 
able to protect themselves against inflation. Using both a probit  and least 
squares estimation methods,  Easterly and Fischer (2001) showed that (1) 
inflation is much of a concern to the poor and the less educated than it is 
to the rich and those with higher education, and (2) inflation has negative 
impact on income inequality. It is possible that higher population could 
mean that a large proportion of the people are poor since few can get 
better education or obtain the level of finance that is needed to break the 
poverty trap. Thus, we will control for population to make sure that the 
impact of inequality we will obtain will not be as a result of population, 
per se.  
 
There are variables that could be correlated with economic growth 
as well as the explanatory variable(s) of interest, yet we might not have 
their data and, therefore, we cannot control for them. A panel data 
structure, however, permits us to handle this, including fixed-country 
effects. Thus, we will estimate the following economic growth  equation: 
 
Git  =   [GDP per capita]it−1  +  β2 FUit×INit +  β3FUit×INit × RA  + γ 
,𝐗𝐢𝐭  
+ uit                                   (3) 
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At least, since Nickell (1981), it has become important to consider 
that when a lagged dependent variable is included as an explanatory 
variable, care should be taken to purge the results of bias due to 
correlation between the fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable. 
The popular estimation techniques that are used in this regard are 
difference GMM and system GMM. Our description of the methods 
follows Bond (2002) and Cavallo and Cavallo (2010) .
9 
 
 
First, let the growth equation be represented by the following 
equation: 
 
 yi,t − yi,t−1   =   α − 1 yi,t−1 + γ
′𝐗i,t + uit           (4) 
 
where yi,t − yi,t−1 is the growth in real per capita GDP, uit  is a composite 
error term and 𝐗 is a set of explanatory variables, except the lag of the 
logarithm of real  per capita GDP. Equation (11) can be written as 
follows: 
 
yi,t  =  αyi,t−1 + γ
′𝐗i,t + uit                (5) 
 
To eliminate the country-specific effects, we can take the first 
difference of  equation (5) : 
 
 yi,t − yi,t−1  =  α yi,t−1 − yi,t−2 + γ
′ 𝐗i,t − 𝐗i,t−1 +  εi,t − εi,t−1   (6) 
                                                          
9
 Bond (2002) is a review of these econometric methods, and Cavallo and Cavallo 
(2010) applied the methods to investigate how  political institutions affect the  impact of 
financial crisis on long-term growth. 
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Differencing eliminates the unobserved country-specific effects, but 
by construction the new error term εi,t − εi,t−1 is correlated with the 
lagged dependent variable yi,t−1 − yi,t−2. Moreover, the control variables 
above may be affected by economic growth so that some or all of the 
variables X are endogenous. As for inequality, the model by Galor and 
Zeira (1993) suggests that a developed economy with high unskilled 
labour wage could attain an egalitarian long run equilibrium while a 
developing economy with low unskilled wage could imply an increase in 
the equilibrium inequality. Also, research ―work suggests that growth 
may free resources which can be used for investment in human capital, 
therefore raising education level‖ (Forbes, 2000, p. 876). Further, as 
Easterly (2007) noted, causal impact of redistribution on economic 
growth could be the reverse since rich countries may afford redistribution. 
This implies 𝐗i,t − 𝐗i,t−1 is necessarily correlated with εi,t − εi,t−1. 
 
The difference GMM estimator uses yi,t−2 , Xi,t−2, and their 
respective higher order lags as instruments
10
, under the assumption that 
the error term is not serially correlated. Specifically, the following 
moment conditions are used by the difference GMM. 
 
E yi,t−s εi,t − εi,t−1  =  0   for s ≥  2 ;  t =  3, …  , T,                  (7) 
E 𝐗i,t−s εi,t − εi,t−1  =  0  for s ≥  2 ;  t =  3, …  , T.       (8) 
 
                                                          
10
 This is commonly referred to as internal instruments 
29 
 
A shortcoming of the difference GMM is that the instruments 
available for the equations in first‐differences are likely to be weak when 
the individual series have near unit root properties. As noted in Castelló-
Climent (2010)
11
, also, traditional first difference GMM estimator may 
not be appropriate since the explanatory power of the time dummies when 
inequality is the dependent variable is 1% such that by taking differences 
much of the variability which comes from variability across countries 
disappear. Therefore, we will employ the system GMM. Under additional 
assumptions, the system GMM which estimates simultaneously the 
equations in their levels and first differences is able to circumvent this 
problem. First, the system GMM assumes that the first differences ∆Xit  
are uncorrelated with the country-specific effects  αi . Second given the 
autoregressive structure of the model and the mild assumption 
E ∆εi,tαi = 0, a stationarity assumption  about the initial condition , 
E   yi,1 −   αi 1 − α    αi = 0 for i= 1, … N, must be valid so that 
∆yit−1 may also be valid instruments for the levels equation (5). The 
system GMM combines moment conditions (7) and (8) with the following 
moment conditions. 
 
E ∆yit−s εit  +  αi  =  0   for s = 1 ;  t =  3, …  , T,                  (9) 
E ∆𝐗it−s εit  +  αi  =  0  for s = 1 ;  t =  3, …  , T.                 (10) 
 
                                                          
11
 Solt (2016) also  pointed out that contemporary levels of inequality are generally 
similar to the levels observed in the preceding year. In fact as stressed by Solt, dramatic 
differences in the estimates of inequality for a given year and those  preceding an d 
following it likely reflect persisting  errors in measurement. 
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Consistency of  the results from  depends on the assumption of no 
serial correlation and validity of the moment conditions stated above. 
Like in many other studies that employ these methods, we will employ 
the Hansen test of identification restrictions, which test the validity of the 
instruments, and a test for no second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals. We test for the second-order serial correlation since 
by construction the first-difference residuals will probably be first order 
serially correlated even if the original error term is not. 
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2.4.  DATA 
 
Income inequality
12
 is from version 6.2 of the  Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Comparability and coverage are 
two issues that bedevil research on the relationship between inequality 
and economic growth. Researchers have relied on either the dataset that is 
very comparable but yields less observations or increased coverage by 
making adjustments to account for  differences between statistics that are 
based on different calculations, which do not satisfactorily deal with 
incomparability of inequality statistics as it results in either 
overestimation or underestimation. The SWIID boasts of maximizing 
comparability and, at the same time, maintaining  a  broad coverage. It is 
calculated, using a source data that that draws on different data sources, 
based on  different combinations of welfare definition and income scale. 
 
Economic Growth, real per capita GDP and Population are from  
the version 9.0 of the Penn World Table. Trade Openness, Inflation, 
Financial Underdevelopment
13
,  Foreign Direct Investment, Domestic 
Investment and Government consumption are from The World Bank. 
Real effective exchange rate  is from the database constructed by Darvas 
(2012). Economic growth is computed as year to year difference in 
logarithms of real per capita GDP. Real per capita GDP is the real gross 
domestic product, at purchasing power parity, divided by population. 
Trade openness is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by 
the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. Inflation  is measured by the  
consumer price index and it  reflects the annual percentage change in the 
                                                          
12
 Our reference for income inequality measure is Solt (2016). 
13
 This is measured as 1 divided by financial development. 
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cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services . 
Our preferred measure of financial development is domestic credit to 
private sector. Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial 
resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as 
through loans, purchases of no equity securities, and trade credits and 
other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. We 
believe that domestic credit to the private sector is in agreement with the 
financial constraints models, like Galor and Zeira (1993)
14
. Foreign direct 
investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than  that of the investor. It is the sum of 
equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and 
short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments, and it is divided 
by GDP. We proxy the ratio of  domestic investment  to GDP by the ratio 
of  gross capital formation  to GDP. Gross capital formation  consists of 
outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes 
in the level of inventories. Government consumption is General 
government final consumption expenditure and includes all government 
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on 
national defense and security, but excludes government military. Real 
effective exchange rate (REER) is the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) multiplied by the consumer price index(CPI)  of the country 
                                                          
14
 The Stock market measures of financial development might not reduce inequality 
since in fact only the wealthy can issue shares, at least, in many countries. See King and 
Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Levine et a l. (2000) for some other 
measures of financial development. 
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under study and divided by the geometrically weighted average of  
trading partners CPI. 
 
The data set consists of 64 countries. Out of the 64 countries, 16 are 
natural resource abundant countries and 48 non-natural resource abundant 
countries, for the period 1988-2012. The  data are averaged over 5 year 
intervals
15
. The first period covers the years 1988-1992; the second period 
covers 1993-1997; the third period covers 1998-2002; the fourth period 
covers 2003-2007, and the last period covers the years 2008-2012. So, 
there are five observations per country and the subscript t in our empirical 
framework above designates one of these averages. It is a popular practice 
in panel data research to take averages: taking averages reduces the short-
run fluctuations and enables us focus on to focus on longer-run  
relationship that is likely in agreement with the literature and our 
theoretical framework. Take for examples, the impact of  inequality on 
economic growth and investment through political instability, that 
inequality increases fertility and reduces human capital which will reduce 
economic growth and the impact of inequality on investment in human 
capital in the presence of imperfect capital markets. The differences in 
economic performances for countries with different income equality is 
likely to be in the long-run (Knowles, 2005). The sample size is 
determined by the availability of data in our variables. The summary 
statistics for the variables are displayed in table 1 below. Variables in 
each country are averaged over the period 1988-2012, so that each 
                                                          
15
 In few cases less than five observations are observed for a period, and averages are 
over the number of observations we have in each of the periods. 
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observation corresponds to a country. The countries in the sample are 
listed in the appendix. 
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        Table 2.1. Summary statistics (1988-2012). 
 
      
VARIABLES N Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
      
IN 64 45.88 6.065 31.89 66.15 
FU 64 0.0551 0.0582 0.00547 0.309 
Inflation 64 28.13 83.24 0.459 487.2 
Trade 64 68.40 47.68 21.65 360.6 
Population 64 73420000 204100000 269,749 1259000000 
real GDP per capita 64 10,787 12,113 714.7 50,055 
growth 64 0.0307 0.0206 -0.0176 0.0823 
FDI 64 2.603 2.060 0.117 14.56 
Domestic Investment 64 22.52 6.163 10.26 40.24 
REER 64 107.4 19.82 80.62 225.1 
Government Consumption 64 13.82 4.152 4.873 25.09 
Debt/GDP 64 61.21 28.03 15.73 141.0 
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2.5.    RESULTS 
 
Table 2.2. system GMM estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log[real GDP per capita]t−1 0.425** 0.409** 0.389** 0.416** 0.422** 0.387** 
 (0.199) (0.189) (0.188) (0.207) (0.201) (0.186) 
FU×IN -0.0358*** -0.0351*** -0.0398*** -0.0339*** -0.0348*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.00595) (0.00546) (0.00503) (0.00483) (0.00519) (0.00404) 
FU×IN×RA  -0.182** -0.116* -0.109* -0.146* -0.177* 
  (0.0842) (0.0702) (0.0628) (0.0802) (0.0933) 
Inflation 0.00176 0.00320 0.00365 0.00183 0.00321 0.00242 
 (0.00202) (0.00359) (0.00382) (0.00230) (0.00360) (0.00277) 
Log (Population) 0.178* 0.194** 0.0651 0.185** 0.180** 0.0859 
 (0.0928) (0.0938) (0.0687) (0.0769) (0.0910) (0.0804) 
Trade 0.00751* 0.00991** 0.0104* 0.00952** 0.0102** 0.00868** 
 (0.00396) (0.00481) (0.00584) (0.00480) (0.00466) (0.00389) 
FDI -0.0323 -0.0694* -0.0859 -0.0601 -0.0648 -0.0706* 
 (0.0281) (0.0407) (0.0527) (0.0391) (0.0398) (0.0398) 
Domestic Investment   0.0345***    
   (0.0106)    
Government Consumption    0.0396   
    (0.0415)   
REER     -0.00183  
     (0.00324)  
Debt/GDP      -0.00783** 
      (0.00351) 
37 
 
 
 
Table 2.2. system GMM estimation (continued)                          
                            (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AR(2) p-value 0.177 0.906 0.536 0.062 0.998 0.0536 
Hansen p-value 0.159 0.297 0.740 0.775 0.618 0.587 
       
Observations 256 256 255 255 256 255 
Dependent variable is Log[real GDP per capita]. Standard errors are  in parentheses .***, **,*  are 
respectively p<0.01p<0.05, p<0.1
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 BASIC MODEL 
 
The results are  in table 2. Specification 1 is a test of  the impact of 
income inequality in the presence of financial underdevelopment on 
economic growth. Specification investigates our hypothesis. It checks if 
countries that have abundant resources suffer  more reduction in 
economic growth when they are faced with high income inequality. 
FUit×INit  in regression 1 is significant and has a negative coefficient ,thus 
confirming that when there is financial under development income 
inequality is detrimental to economic growth. 
 
 Inflation  does not have a significant impact on economic growth 
in all the specifications table 3.Population is significant in regression 1 
and 2 and becomes insignificant when domestic investment is included. 
FDI has a negative impact on economic growth. While this seem  
puzzling ,it could be mirroring the idea in the literature that FDI has 
positive impact only when some initial conditions are satisfied. Trade has 
a positive and  significant impact on economic growth in all the 
specifications of table 3. FUit×INit  is still negative and significant in 
specification 2 when a triple interaction FU×IN×RA is included. The 
triple interaction term FU×IN×RA enters significantly and has negative 
sign as we hypothesized. This suggests that the negative impact of 
inequality on economic growth is amplified for countries that are 
endowed with abundant natural resources.  
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ROBUSTNESS  
 
Domestic Investment: Specification 3 controls for domestic investment 
to check whether  the finding that inequality is more damaging in 
resource abundant countries  is linked to the investment .Following the 
sensitivity analyses  by Levine and Renelt (1992), at least, there is  a 
robust correlation between economic growth and  share of investment in 
GDP. Our  finding could be due to different levels of investment in 
different countries. If the countries who have abundant resources have 
less domestic investment compared to those who have less resources, our 
result could be an implication of low investment. Following our 
argument, countries who have the same physical investment could have 
different economic growth path if potential entrepreneurs have different 
incentives. In specification 3, domestic investment enters significantly 
and with a positive sign. The double and triple interaction still have  
negative coefficients and  are both significant. This confirms that our 
result is robust to the inclusion of domestic investment. 
 
Government Consumption: There is a widely held belief that 
government consumption affects economic growth. Some studies argue 
that the impact of government consumption is positive while others argue 
that government consumption has a negative impact on economic growth. 
Grier and Tullock (1989) found a negative (positive) correlation between 
growth of  government consumption and GDP growth in Africa and 
Americas (Asia). Nevertheless, government consumption could be low or 
high depending on how much natural resources a country has. If 
government consumption has a negative impact, resource abundant 
countries could have less growth when compared to non resource 
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abundance countries since government consumption in these countries is 
apparently bigger. In specification 4 we controlled for government 
consumption to check if the result we have obtained in specification 2 is 
due to omission of government consumption. FU×IN×RA  is still   
negative and significant coefficient which implies that our finding  is not 
due to government consumption. 
 
Real Effective Exchange Rate: In the resource curse literature, the 
Dutch disease argument has its own share when the negative impact of 
resource abundance is the issue. Following the resource movement 
argument in Corden and Neary (1982). It can be that the result we have 
obtained  is due to  the reallocation of labour from manufacturing to other 
sectors due to changes in real exchange rate. Specification 5 controls for  
real effective exchange rate. Still, the coefficient on FU×IN×RA is 
significant. While this does not refute the Dutch disease argument, it 
shows that the rent seeking argument that we have  is  an important 
determinant of poor economic performance. 
 
External Debt: There is a possibility that countries who have natural 
resource in abundance accumulate high external debt, and could face 
heavy debt burden. In his article —The External Debt Problem of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Greene (1989) linked  oil price boom  to the debt distress 
faced by some Sub Saharan African countries. A potential implication of 
debt burden is that it reduces economic growth. Debt burden could make 
it difficult for countries to focus on growth enhancing expenditures since 
a significant proportion of government revenue would be directed to 
meeting debt obligations. One empirical investigation of  the relationship 
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between eternal debt and economic growth  is Fosu (1999). Using a 
sample of 35 Sub Saharan Africa countries for the period 1980-1990, 
Fosu (1999) provided empirical result which suggest that external debt 
has a negative impact on economic growth. Following the logic that the 
resource curse could be indicating debt overhang, as in  Manzano and 
Rigobon (2002), we will control for  the ratio of debt to GDP 
16
. Our 
findings still remains. The coefficient on FU×IN×RA is negative and 
significant. 
 
The results in table 2 also show the presence of conditional 
convergence. To see this,  first note that we are estimating equation (5) so 
that that the effect on growth for Log[real GDP per capita]t−1 has to be 
calculated by subtracting by 1. It is then obvious that specifications 
suggest the presence of convergence. 
 
 The six specifications includes time dummies to control for time 
specific effects. The regression satisfy the specifications tests. There is no 
evidence of second order serial correlation and all the regressions passed 
the Hansen specification test. 
 
Table 2 uses the whole instrument possible in estimation, that is lag  
two up to lag 4  are  used as instruments. Criticism
17
 exist on the 
                                                          
16
 The argument is often made with external debt., but  availability of external debt 
data is limited. We instead used the historical public debt database compiled by Abbas, 
Belhocine,  El-Ganainy and  Horton (2011), taking into consideration that public debt is 
a combination of external and domestic debt. 
17
 See Roodman (2009) 
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implication of instrument proliferation, especially on the P-value of the 
Hansen statistics. One way to address it is to reduce the number of 
instruments. In the appendix we provide result used second lag and the 
third lags are used  as instruments. Our result did not change. 
Specifically, the coefficient on FU×IN×RA is negative and significant in 
all the specification where it is included. The p-value from AR(2) and  
Hansen  over identification tests show that the model is over identified 
and that there is no second order serial correlation. 
43 
 
2.6.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper makes a case for a strong association between natural resource 
abundance and the inequality-growth nexus. First equality might not 
reduce economic growth in  resource abundant countries from  Okun‘s 
point of view since countries where natural resources  form a large 
proportion of  exports have no incentive to lose, after all. Moreover, given 
two otherwise similar countries, the country where productive members 
move to  non-productive sectors of the economy will likely have lower 
economic growth performance. Because income  inequality implies that 
political competition  is not strong enough to deter entrepreneur from 
competing for a political post and since it is less expensive to buy votes 
(or even the conscience) of the masses who would vote with their 
stomach, we expect entrepreneurs to be more willing  move to rent 
seeking in the presence of income inequality. In other words, given 
income inequality, the countries who have resources in abundance, all 
else equal, should experience more detrimental  impact of income 
inequality in the presence of financial underdevelopment. And, countries‘ 
resource curse could be worse when countries have income inequality.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Greasing The Revolving Door: Foreign Aid, Governance and Private 
Capital Flows 
Keywords: Capital flow; Governance; Foreign aid 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate concerning the impact of capital liberalization on economic 
growth is an old one, and had yielded many reason why capital 
liberalization should encourage economic growth. One notable reason is 
rooted in the small open economy neoclassical economic growth model. 
Our discussion of this argument follows Henry (2007).Consider a 
neoclassical production function with marginal product of capital  that is 
equal to interest rate plus the rate of depreciation. When unrestricted, 
capital go from capital-abundant countries where returns is low to capital-
scarce countries where return to capital is high. Thus, from an initial 
steady state level of capital, capital liberalization triggers capital inflow 
from the developed to the developing countries, thereby, increasing 
economic growth, temporarily, before the new steady state is reached. 
Furthermore, as argued in Henry (2007), most studies have failed to 
obtain a positive relationship between capital liberalization and economic 
growth because they do not test the supposed short-run growth effects or 
the permanent effect on per capita income as suggested by the 
neoclassical growth model. 
 
However, it is possible that liberalization do not lead to capital 
inflow to the capital-scarce countries. Lucas (1990) is the first to show  
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that the observed capital flows fall short of the capital flows that the 
neoclassical model predicts. Following the neoclassical theory, Lucas 
(1990) arrived at marginal product of capital in India that is 58 times the 
marginal product of capital in the United States. This suggest that capital 
should flow rapidly from the United States and other wealthy countries to 
India and other capital-poor economies. Lucas(1990) considered, broadly, 
three factors that could play some role in the determinants of capital 
flows, namely differences in human capital, capital market imperfection 
(what he referred to as political risk) and monopoly control over capital. 
 
A notable study which empirically investigates the explanations for 
the Lucas paradox  is Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2008). 
And, they empirically showed  that  low institutional quality is the leading 
explanation for the Lucas puzzle. To buttress the role of institution in 
attracting capital, Alfaro et al. (2008) used some examples. First is Intel‘s 
decision to locate in Costa Rica instead of Mexico in 1996. Both 
countries had similar levels of adult literacy but Mexico had more 
population. Given the overall size of  Intel‘s and the need for large 
number of engineers Mexico should be preferred. But, Intel decided to 
invest in Costa Rica since Costa Rica showed a great willingness to 
improve the overall country‘s institution. Second, around October 2005 
when Turkey started negotiations into European Union, a move which 
would force turkey to become like the EU countries in terms of laws, 
regulations and policies. The institutional reform in Turkey led to 
investment in Turkey by Multinational companies. 
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Matsuyama (2005) addressed  the capital flows implication for a 
developing country who has the same features with a developed country, 
except that the level of financial development  and balance sheet 
condition of firms in the two countries  are different. Specifically, the 
developed country is more financially developed. The implication of 
financial underdevelopment in the developing country  is an outflow of 
capital from the developing to the developed country. The model by 
Matsuyama (2005) seems to provide an indirect channel through which 
institution could have an impact on capital flow. One study linking 
institution to financial development is Weil (2011).Weil (2011) 
investigated the impact of corruption on bank lending in Russia. 
Corruption discourages banks from engaging in lending since it adds to 
the uncertainty of the judicial decisions for banks as the banks cannot 
count on the courts to enforce damages recoveries for losses or deficiency 
judgment against defaulting debtors. Using regional data on corruption 
and bank level data for the period 2002,Weil (2011) found that corruption 
has negative and significant impact on customer loans. 
 
Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2010) explored  the effect of  
international financial integration on economic development due to 
bureaucratic corruption. According to their model, there is a positive 
relationship between the incidence of corruption and financial openness. 
In their model, this is because openness reduces the probability that 
corrupt bureaucrats would be caught. Related  to Blackburn and Forgues-
Puccio (2010) is the revolving door argument in Boyce (1992) and 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2011). First, these studies observed that private 
citizens of a number of third world countries accumulated substantial 
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external assets at the same time their governments incurred large external 
debts. Some reasons are proposed, thereafter. Two among their 
classification of the  hypothetical linkages between capital flight and debt 
are noteworthy, namely debt-fuelled capital flight and flight-driven 
external debt. In flight-driven external debt, drain of domestic resources 
through capital flight generates demand for replacement of funds on the 
part of the government and the private sector. In debt-fuelled capital flight 
(which is related to the incentive of corrupt governments to  siphon debt), 
the same individual (or bureaucrat) who borrows the money invest it in 
his or her private account abroad, and the money is never used for the 
purpose it is meant for. On this basis, these studies concluded that there is 
a scope for political and legal challenges to the legitimacy of a substantial 
fraction of the developing countries‘ external debt. Specifically, the 
studies  recommended that odious debt should be repudiated. 
 
Cerra, Rishi and Saxena (2008) is one paper that is related to Boyce 
(1992) and Ndikumana and Boyce (2011). Cerra et al. (2008) posited and 
estimated two relationships, namely (a) capital flight is partially 
determined by institutional quality  and (b) debt accumulation or other 
forms of foreign financing is partially determined by capital flight. 
Results from their analyses suggest that countries with weak institution 
are more likely to accumulate debt since they are more exposed to capital 
flight. The finding in Cerra et al. (2008) that  countries with weak 
institutions have the propensity to  accumulate debt because weak 
institution instigate capital flight seems to support the fight-derive debt 
hypothetical linkage. The only difference is that in Cerra et al. (2008) 
capital flight is in large part due to poor institution. 
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While foreign debt occupies an important position  in economic 
research, foreign aid has an important position  as well. In their paper, 
Ending Africa‘s Poverty Trap, Sachs et al. (2004) advocated  giving  aid  
to African countries. In fact their understanding is that governance is not 
enough. According to Sachs et al. (2004), ‗‗Africa‘s extreme poverty 
leads to low national savings rates. Low domestic saving  is not offset by 
large capital inflows of private foreign capital…Africa‘s poor 
infrastructure and weak human capital discourage such flows…well 
governed African countries should be offered a substantial increase in 
official development assistance (ODA). ‘‘ 
 
Put aside that capital flight undermines the effectiveness of aid, a 
considerable amount of studies exist to show that aid could  have a  
negative  impact on governance. If aid poses damage to the governance of 
a country, it could actually do more  harm  than good. If governance is 
poor, it means that capital could flow out of the country.  A notable study  
that stresses that aid could harm  governance is Knack (2001). As 
discussed in Knack (2001), some of the reasons  why aid can hinder good 
governance are as follows. Aid can relieve the pressure on recipient 
governments to establish efficient policies and institutions that are 
necessary for attracting  private capital, since aid provides an alternative 
source of revenues for governments. Secondly, by siphoning away scarce 
talent from the civil service and by implementing projects that local 
governments would have undertaken foreign aid can reduce the 
bureaucratic quality in the recipient countries. And, aid can at times be 
used to sustain large government subsidies to state owned enterprises and 
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parastatals. If public firms displace private investments, a weakened 
private sector cannot put a sufficient amount  of pressure  on government 
to establish accountable and transparent procedures and institutions. 
Indeed, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS), Knack (2001) showed that aid has a negative impact on 
governance.  Also,  Rajan and Subramanian (2007) investigated the 
nature of growth of value added for industries that depend on governance. 
The idea in their study is that governance should have a positive 
relationship with growth of industries .If industries that are sensitive to 
governance grow less after obtaining aid it could be that aid reduced 
governance. Result from Rajan and Subramanian (2007) suggest that  in 
countries that receive aid, the industrial sectors that are more governance 
sensitive have lower growth. 
 
Going back to Cerra et al. (2008), we could add a third door. 
Following Cerra et al. (2008) we know  that Capital flight encourages 
inflow of foreign aid and  poor institution triggers capital flight. From the 
foregoing we add that aid harms governance  to the revolving door  
literature.  Furthermore, while the institution in Cerra et al. (2008) is the 
constraint on executive power which makes it more difficult for the 
bureaucrats to siphon money, our studies is based on  governance 
measures like corruption, law and order and bureaucratic quality. 
Methodologically, we employ Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) 
estimation technique to investigate the revolving door. 
 
Our synthesis is related to the literature on institution and 
development. There is already a consensus that institution plays an 
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important role in economic development. Important examples are Mauro 
(1995) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004). Mauro(1995) 
demonstrated  that bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption have negative 
impact on economic growth and investment. And, that a considerable 
portion of the impact of corruption on economic growth works through its 
effect on  the amount  investment. A more forceful conclusion on the role 
of institution on economic performance is Rodrik et al. (2004). Rodrik et 
al. (2004) investigated the impact of institution, vis-à-vis  international 
trade and geography, on economic development. using 2SLS estimation 
technique, the found that institution  plays  a more important role than 
geography and international trade. Once institution are controlled for, 
geography has, at  best, a weak direct effect on income, while integration 
has no direct effect on income. In the words of Rodrik et al.(2004), ‗‗ 
institutions trump geography and openness.‘‘ As capital inflows impact 
on economic growth and institutions impact on capital flows, our 
synthesis provides an indirect avenue, through capital outflows, by which 
institutions can have an impact on economic performance. To the best of 
our knowledge, we are the first to empirically investigate such synthesis. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 
discusses the empirical technique that will be employed by the synthesis. 
Section 3.3 discusses the data. Section 3.4 provides empirical results. 
Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2.  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The above discussion implies the following  panel 3 equations: 
 
Private_Inflow it  =  α0 +  α1 Governanceit  +  α2Inflationit   
+  α3 Democracyit   + u1it                 (1) 
 
Aid =  β0 +β1 Private_Inflowit   + β2 log GNI_ per capita it   
+ β3Democracy + u2it                   (2) 
 
Governanceit  =γ0+γ1 log Human_capital it+  γ2 Aidit   
+γ3  Democracyit  + u3it               (3) 
 
 
Equation (1)  is the relationship between governance and capital 
inflows. We expect that the governance coefficient will be positive so that 
a  higher  quality of  governance corresponds to an increase in private 
capital inflow. Equation  (2) is the relationship between foreign aid and 
private inflow. We expect the coefficient on private inflow to be negative 
such that an increase in private inflow means there would be less need for 
foreign aid. Inversely, an increase in capital outflow would imply an 
increase in foreign aid. Equation (3) is the relationship between  
governance and  foreign aid. We expect the coefficient on foreign aid to 
be negative so that an  increase in foreign aid would imply a decrease in 
the quality of governance. 
 
In addition to the main variables that our analysis focuses on, we 
have included two additional variables that we believe have an impact on 
the dependent variables in each of the 3  equations.  First, for equation 
(1), we believe macro economic instability can pose a considerable 
amount of risk and would make investors reluctant to invest in a country. 
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We proxy macroeconomic instability and uncertainty with inflation. 
Democracy provides checks and balances on elected officials  which in 
turn reduces arbitrary government intervention, lowers the risk of policy 
reversal and strengthens property right protection. Asiedu and Lien 
(2011) found that the impact of democracy on foreign direct investment 
depends on how much natural resources the host country has. For 
countries with abundant natural resources FDI is negatively related to 
democracy, while democracy facilitates FDI  in countries where the share 
of natural resources in total exports is low. Thus, why we include 
democracy in equation (1), we do not make any a priori expectation on 
the sign of its coefficient. 
 
In equation (2), it seem very likely that countries that have bad 
economic performance are the countries who need aid. And, income per 
capita has received a considerable support in empirical research as a 
variable that explain  the decision of donors. We also add democracy in 
equation (2) because donors might demand that countries who wish to 
receive aid become democratic in nature. Some determinants of foreign 
aid can be found in (Strum, Berger and Han, 2005 and Barro and Lee, 
2005).We expect  that higher democracy should lead to more aid  while 
higher GNI per capita should lead to low aid. 
 
For the governance equation, equation (3), we add human capital 
since we believe that more educated persons are more willing to realize 
that there is a gap in governance, the implication  of the gap in 
governance and can be more equipped to  push for better governance 
more than the less educated persons. We also include democracy, and the 
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reason is that since democracies allow population to peacefully and 
regularly oust corrupt administrations (Riverra-Batiz,2002), it should 
have positive impact on governance. 
 
We will employ the Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS)  estimation 
method proposed by Zellner and Theil (1962).This estimation technique 
involves estimating the 3 equations simultaneously. Zellner and Theil 
(1962) showed that when the error terms are correlated or when the 
equations are over identified, in the sense that the exogenous variables in 
the system are greater in number that the variables on the right hand side 
of each equation of the system, the 3SLS is more efficient than  the 2SLS 
.In our case, we  have four pre determined variables and 3 equations on 
the right hand side of  each of the system. As a way to check for 
robustness, and to make sure our result are not driven by omitted 
unobserved country effects and time effects, we will also control for fixed 
effects. 
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3.3.  DATA 
This chapter discusses the measures and sources of the variables used in 
the analysis and, as well, provides a summary statistics for the variables. 
The data consist of 41 countries in the DAC list of ODA recipient for the 
period 1995-2013.The list of countries is in the appendix. The variables in 
the analysis are governance, inflation, democracy, private capital inflow, 
per capita GNI, foreign aid and human capital. 
 
The quality of governance is measured by subjective indices from 
the  International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). ICRG  is a commercial 
source on country risk that provides information on political risk to 
overseas investors and lenders. Like in Knack (2001), we sum the 
corruption in government, quality of bureaucracy and law and order 
indices. Each of the indices is  a 0-6 point scale where 6 is the highest 
level and shows good quality of a given index. Summation of the three 
variables implies an index with maximum point of 18 points  and  a 
lowest point of 0.  
 
Inflation, GNI per capita, and Aid  are from The World Bank. 
Inflation is measured by the annual growth rate of GDP implicit deflator, 
and it shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The 
GDP deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in 
constant local currency.GNI per capita is the per capita gross national 
income converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. Aid is the net official development assistance and consists of 
disbursement of loans made on concession terms (net of repayment of 
principals) and grants by official agencies of the members of the 
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development assistance commission (DAC), by multilateral institution, 
and non DAC countries to promote economic development in countries in 
the DAC list of ODA recipient. 
 
Our capital flow measure is the net private inflow constructed by 
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2014). Alfaro decomposed the 
current account data into purely private flows and purely sovereign flows. 
Using the international financial statistics (IFS) from the IMF and the 
World Bank‘s  global development finance(GDF) database. 
 
Our measure of democracy is from the Freedom in the World 
survey provided by the Freedom House. The Freedom in the World 
survey provides an annual evaluation of the state of the global freedom as 
experience by individuals. The survey is grouped into two broad 
categories, namely political rights and civil liberties. The category we use 
is political rights. Political rights enable people to participate freely in 
political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives 
in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and 
organizations, elect representatives who have decisive impact on public 
policies and are accountable to the electorate. The survey includes both 
analytical reports and numerical ratings for countries. In terms  of 
numerical ratings, each country is assigned a numerical on the scale of 1 
to 7.A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 is the 
lowest level of freedom. 
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Human capital measure is from the Penn World Table (PWT)  
version 9.0.It is an index based on years of schooling and returns to 
education. 
 
The summary statistics for the for the variables is  in table 1 below. 
Table 3.1.    Summary Statistics (1995-2013 ) 
 
VARIABLES N Mean Std. 
Dev 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
      
Private_Inflow 41 3.896 2.263 0.167 10.29 
Governance 41 7.299 1.449 4.357 10.26 
Democracy 41 3.612 1.475 1 7 
Inflation 41 8.961 7.390 1.370 36.17 
Human_Capital 41 2.107 0.473 1.137 2.849 
GNI_per capita 41 5,942 4,069 623.2 15,589 
Aid 41 3.922 5.033 0.0306 22.11 
      
 
There are 41 countries in the sample. For the descriptive analysis, the 
variables in each country are averaged over the period 1995-2013, so that 
each observation corresponds  to a country. 
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3.4.   RESULTS 
 
The result is in table 2 below. In equation (1),  higher  quality of 
governance  increases the net private inflow. A one standard deviation 
increase in governance (1.449 in the summary statistics presented in table 
1) leads to 1.182 percentage increase in Private_Inflow . 
 
 
Table 1. 2.  3SLS estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Private_Inflow Aid Governance 
    
Governance 0.816**   
 (0.385)   
Inflation -0.00770   
 (0.00905)   
Democracy -0.414*** -1.149*** -0.0363 
 (0.113) (0.389) (0.0392) 
Private_Inflow  -1.827**  
  (0.801)  
log (GNI_ per capita)  -4.011***  
  (0.389)  
Aid   -0.0807*** 
   (0.0247) 
Human_Capital   0.643 
   (0.413) 
Constant -0.495 48.71*** 7.287*** 
 (2.909) (3.643) (0.445) 
    
Observations 779 779 779 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Equation (2) shows  that the inflow of  private capital reduces the 
need for foreign aid. This implies that an outflow of foreign capital 
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should increase the need for foreign aid. Equation (3) suggests that aid 
hinders good governance. Taken together, the result in table (2) suggests 
that aid could hinder governance and ,thereby, reduce private inflow since 
private inflow depends on good governance. When Private capital flows 
out, there is need for aid to feel the gap created by capital outflow. 
Moreover, the inflow of capital and outflow of capital will not be possible 
in the absence of capital liberalization. Thus, capital liberalization could 
grease a revolving door and handicap economic development in  the aid  
receiving countries. The result is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects 
(see table 3 in appendix). 
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3.5.   CONCLUSION 
 
Capital liberalization  is one of the policies that is widely suggested for 
developing countries. The general idea is that capital liberalization could 
lead capital to flow into the capital scarce developing economies and 
boosts economic development in these countries. Debt relief sometimes 
are suggested for the highly indebted countries, or in some cases 
commentators suggest that the developing countries should be given 
foreign aid since these countries  are handicapped by geographical factors 
that inhibits growth beyond a poverty level. While aid can be important  
jump-starting  the growth process of income trapped economies, most of 
the developing countries experience private capital outflows, as well. 
Moreover, it is possible that aid could harm development as well. Aid 
could hinder development indirectly by weakening governance in the 
recipient countries. If aid hinders governance, it could discourage capital 
inflow from the capital-abundant developed countries to the developing 
countries who have little capital, in fact ,it could  trigger capital reversal 
such that capital flows out of  country the aid recipient countries. Further, 
the need to fill the gap created by private capital outflows encourages 
more foreign aid, which in turn leads to capital outflow. 
 
Using Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimation technique that 
is  proposed in Zellner and Theil (1962),  we explore the relationship 
between foreign aid, governance and capital flows. We find evidence of a 
revolving door relationship. Foreign aid has a negative impact on 
governance and  ,thereby, reduces  capital inflows since bad governance 
hinders capital inflows. The need to fill the gap that is created by private 
capital outflows encourages inflow of foreign aid ,which in turn harms 
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governance. Our empirical result has a clear policy implication. Capital 
liberalization could grease a revolving door and handicap economic 
development in  the aid  receiving countries. One policy implication, 
therefore, could be that capital outflow should be restricted in these aid 
recipient countries by use of capital controls. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 2.3. 
  
 
List of  Countries 
 
                   Non-Resources 
    
Argentina 
Australia 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Brazil 
Burundi 
Canada 
Cameroon 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Israel 
Japan 
Jordan 
Korea 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
 
 
 
 
 
 Resources 
 
Algeria 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Chile 
Côte d‘Ivoire 
Ecuador 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Lao 
Mexico 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
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Table 2.4: system GMM estimation (reduced instruments) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log[real GDP per capita]t−1 0.419** 0.396** 0.382** 0.377** 0.394** 0.375** 
 (0.205) (0.177) (0.168) (0.186) (0.187) (0.182) 
FU×IN -0.0369*** -0.0359*** -0.0415*** -0.0353*** -0.0358*** -0.0334*** 
 (0.00604) (0.00548) (0.00536) (0.00517) (0.00510) (0.00413) 
FU×IN×RA  -0.204** -0.134* -0.160** -0.186* -0.186* 
  (0.0929) (0.0783) (0.0719) (0.102) (0.101) 
Inflation 0.00170 0.00328 0.00357 0.00219 0.00320 0.00278 
 (0.00210) (0.00376) (0.00376) (0.00288) (0.00373) (0.00319) 
Log (Population) 0.204** 0.206** 0.0902 0.202** 0.206** 0.127 
 (0.0950) (0.0999) (0.0812) (0.0966) (0.0927) (0.0840) 
Trade 0.00818* 0.0107** 0.0110* 0.0101** 0.0117** 0.0105** 
 (0.00485) (0.00516) (0.00584) (0.00490) (0.00518) (0.00461) 
FDI -0.0289 -0.0679* -0.0836* -0.0593 -0.0669* -0.0708* 
 (0.0311) (0.0402) (0.0461) (0.0393) (0.0394) (0.0424) 
Government Consumption    0.0530   
    (0.0441)   
Domestic Investment   0.0377***    
   (0.0105)    
REER     -0.000731  
     (0.00300)  
Debt/GDP      -0.00664* 
      (0.00343) 
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Table 2.4: system GMM estimation (reduced instruments) (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
AR(2) p-value 0.228 0.602 0.485 0.717 0.557 0.771 
Hansen-Pvalue 0.147 0.166 0.380 0.334 0.315 0.413 
Observations 256 256 255 255 256 255 
Dependent variable is Log[real GDP per capita]. Standard errors are  in parentheses .***, **,*  are 
respectively p<0.01p<0.05, p<0.1 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Table 3.3. 
 
 
 
List of  Countries 
Bangladesh 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Senegal 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Côte d‘Ivoire 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ghana 
Honduras 
India 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Tunisia 
Philippines 
Jordan 
Albania 
Argentina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
China 
Colombia 
Malaysia 
Costa Rica 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Panama 
 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
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Table 3.4.   3SLS with fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Private_Inflow Aid Governance 
    
Governance 3.747***   
 (1.238)   
Inflation -0.00136   
 (0.00507)   
Democracy 1.213*** -0.114 -0.424*** 
 (0.406) (0.133) (0.0984) 
Private_Inflow  -0.724***  
  (0.217)  
log (GNI_ per capita)  1.387  
  (1.352)  
Aid   -0.604** 
   (0.249) 
Human_Capital   2.266 
   (2.954) 
Constant -34.70*** -6.280 10.73*** 
 (10.93) (9.920) (1.117) 
    
Observations 779 779 779 
    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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